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Understanding early modern sea captains
1 It  was  only  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  that  the  English  nation  seriously
attempted for the first time to express ambitions for an empire to rival those of Spain in
the west (in the New World) and of the Ottomans in the east.1 A series of bulls issued by
Pope Alexander VI, ratified by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, had carved up the known
and unknown worlds between Spain and Portugal, thereby debarring other nations from
trade in the New World. In the Treaty of Saragossa of 1529, a new line of demarcation in
the Pacific  split  the control  of  lands in this  region between Spain and Portugal.  The
response of European nations excluded from colonial and imperial expansion, valuable
natural resources, and trading opportunities, was to both plunder and seek ways to break
the monopoly through actual and textual activities.2 Sea captains were at the vanguard of
the response to secure what the English believed to be the nation’s share of territory and
trade, and their activities are central to written accounts of explorations and adventures.
2 For Englishmen, according to Elias Canetti in Crowds and Power (1960), the figure of the sea
captain was a “remarkably stable” national self-identity that endured for generations:
“[t]he Englishman sees himself as a captain on board a ship with a small group of people,
the sea around and beneath him. He is  almost alone; as captain he is  in many ways
isolated from his crew” (171). Canetti describes how this isolated male figure, personified
by his ship, imposed his “absolute” and “undisputed” “power of command” on a sea that
is “there to be ruled,” and how the sea captain provided a powerful collective vision and
symbol of how Englishmen should behave and interact with others (171). In this article, I
test the validity of Canetti’s analysis in relation to accounts of English sea captaincy of the
“long 1590s.” Defined as the period between the defeat of the Armada in 1588 and the
death of Elizabeth in 1603, “it was the formative decade for the shaping of English literary
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and historiographical self-consciousness, and left an aesthetic legacy that underpinned
literary endeavour and notions of literary value for well over a century” (Connolly and
Hopkins, “Preface: the Long 1590s”). More precisely, at the end of the sixteenth century
England was attempting to increase and announce its presence within a global economy
through  a  marked  uptick  in  actual  overseas  activities,  and  by  announcing  and
consolidating,  as well  as inspiring further achievement,  through the dissemination of
written accounts of exploration. To address the sea captain’s role in these processes, in
this article I discuss first the importance of the execution in contested circumstances of
Thomas Doughty, on the orders of Francis Drake on the first English circumnavigation,
for understanding more generally the values and practice of leadership at sea. However,
my focus  is  chiefly  on  the  significance  of  the  murky  circumstances  of  the  death  of
England’s celebrated second circumnavigator, Sir Thomas Cavendish, and the fractious
conditions on board that led to it, for analysing “the power of command,” to use Canetti’s
phrase.  Richard Hakluyt  included an account  Drake’s  voyage in  both editions  of  The
Principal  Navigations,  Voiages  and Discoveries  of  the  English Nation (1589;  2 nd revised and
expanded edition 1598/99-1600, with the title of the latter promising information about
the  nation’s  “traffiques”),3 and  he  published  an  account  of  Cavendish’s  failed
circumnavigation in the later edition. Versions of the voyages printed by Hakluyt are the
focus here. Hakluyt’s collection, which included over 600 accounts of individual voyages
in the expanded, second edition, and ran to over 1.75 million words, is emblematic of the
scope of  England’s global  ambitions in the long 1590s.  Drake never himself  wrote an
account of  his  circumnavigation,  though a handful  of  versions of  events by his  crew
survive  (Quinn  “Early  Accounts”  33-48).  Cavendish  wrote  his  narrative  of  shipboard
actions just before his death, with other crew members writing accounts of the voyage on
return,  in  the  knowledge  of  Cavendish’s  manuscript  (Edwards  34,  40,  43).4 On  both
voyages, the sea captain’s “power of command” is tested and strained, and each faces
hazardous and extreme challenges to his leadership.
3 Of course, the question begged by Canetti’s analysis is can the sea, or indeed the ship’s
crew, ever really be ruled “absolutely” by the ship’s  captain? Given the innumerable
shipwrecks  and  millions  of  deaths  at  sea  that  traverse  human  history,  claims  of
“mastering the sea” are, of course, rhetorical rather than actual.5 Yet, nevertheless, the
vocabulary of command is pervasive in literary and historical accounts. In this article, I
explore the ways a sea captain implicitly or explicitly claims undisputed power, but also
how  these  claims  are  simultaneously  debated  and  contested,  as  well  as  why  these
particular issues emerged in such an insistent way at the end of the sixteenth century. As
we shall see, a more complex, multivalent, and historically specific relationship emerges
than allowed by Canetti’s confident statement about sea captains’ connections to English
self-identity and heroic prowess over the longue durée.
4 It is easy to see Canetti’s model of heroic power in action in triumphalist nineteenth-
century  accounts  of  sea  captains  from  England’s  imperial  and  colonial  past.6 Even
illustrations from children’s lullabies, and of women, received heroic treatment at times,
with for example Alma Strettell including in Lullabies of Many Lands (1894) a drawing of an
Elizabethan ship in full sail. On a ship named the England, Queen Elizabeth captains from
the stern. The queen imperiously points the way forward for the ship (of state) and the
nation,  metonymically represented by three male figures under her sway,  positioned
beneath her under her command, like the vessel/nation.
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Fig. 1. Illustration by Emily J. Harding in Alma Stretting, Lullabies of Many Lands: Collected and Rendered
into English Verse (London: George Allen, 1894), p.117.
British Library, General Reference Collection 11601.g.25. No known copyright restrictions.
5 A key articulation, often cited, from English imperial and colonial history of what Canetti
termed sea captains’ “power of command” are the claims J. A. Froude made for England’s
nautical history in 1852. He famously described Hakluyt’s The Principal Navigations as “the
prose epic of  the modern English nation” in The Westminster  Review (34).  Accounts of
English sea captains’ seaborne male fortitude, power, and heroism certainly are central to
The Principal Navigations. Indeed Hakluyt wrote at the beginning of the 1589 edition that it
aimed to rouse the English from their “sluggish security” to emulate the achievements of
“other nations miraculously extolled for their  discoveries  and notable enterprises by
sea,” with sea captains at the vanguard (Hakluyt 2r).7 Yet, though the narratives Hakluyt
included  in  the  collection  do  repeatedly  show  sea  captains  supporting  Elizabethan
expansionist policies abroad, defending the nation in times of war, and providing a model
of patriotic manhood, they behave less than heroically at least as often.8 Both editions of
the collection frequently include accounts of bitter disputes between leading participants
for  control  over  the  direction of  a  voyage.  Rarely  are  arguments  resolved amicably:
instead, there are numerous descriptions of fierce debate, desertion, mutiny, execution,
violence, and even murder.
6 Drake,  England’s  first  circumnavigator  notoriously  executed his  sometime friend and
fellow commander Thomas Doughty for mutiny and treason in 1578 while on the voyage.
Doughty, as Sir Christopher Hatton’s private secretary, was well connected, and Hatton
was one of the investors in the voyage (Kelsey 75, 82). Hakluyt published the first detailed
account of the circumnavigation in the 1589 edition of The Principal Navigations, having
had to edit and redact his sources quickly, most likely the journal of the chaplain Francis
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Fletcher, who was hostile to Drake, having been “excommunicated” by him in the wake of
Doughty’s  execution  (Kelsey  393).9 Indeed,  the  justice  of  the  execution  and  Drake’s
authority and right-to-command it were widely questioned both at the time of the trial
and on the ship’s return to England, and it cast a long shadow on Drake’s subsequent
career (Kelsey 80-110; Quinn, Sir Francis Drake 4-5). Moreover, in terms of the incident’s
larger  significance,  the execution  of  Doughty  by  Drake  is  a  watershed  moment  in
maritime history, and a crucial one for the issues explored in this article. Drake’s killing
of his one-time friend imposed for the first time the absolute authority of one individual
as sole master of the ship. As John Cooke commented in his “Narrative,” when the fleet
left  England  “Francys  Drake,  John  Winter  and  Thomas  Doughtie”  were  “eqwall
companyons and frindly gentlemen” (Penzer 142; Kelsey 98). Yet by executing Doughty so
ruthlessly, Drake, the “tarpaulin officer,” (i.e. a sea-bred superior officer) categorically
established his chain of command over his social superiors, the gentlemen officers (i.e.
elite military officers appointed to command). This was a remarkable shift, turning on its
head the established seafaring custom that masters should consult the elite officers at
sea. According to medieval maritime law, such as the twelfth-century compilation Rôles
d’Oléron, masters should refer to their companies, and vestiges of this custom survived in
English ships into the sixteenth century.10 Winter and Doughty, and the other socially
elite officers onboard, expected to be part of Drake’s council as a matter of course, rather
than treated as his subordinates.11 Drake’s execution of Doughty established a precedent
for the idea that one captain is sole master on a voyage. The effects of this change had
important ramifications and, indeed, perhaps this event and moment in history marks
the  emergence  of  the  ideology  of  the  absolute  “power  of  command”  of  English  sea
captains, as summarized by Canetti. Certainly, Drake’s actions, I argue, influence onboard
fleet politics and behaviour on the voyage of his seafaring successor, the second English
circumnavigator, Cavendish.
 
Changing definitions: professionalizing leadership at
sea
7 An equally dramatic argument took place on Cavendish’s last tragic voyage, his attempted
second circumnavigation, which departed from Plymouth in August 1591 and on which he
lost his life in disputed circumstances. My focus is on answering how and why the “power
of command,” though claimed by Cavendish as “Captain Generall” (the person in overall
command of a force at sea and on land) as absolute, were so bitterly contested on this
particular  voyage.  More  broadly,  I  explore  the  implications  of  shipboard  events  for
understanding major and significant shifts in the role of the sea captain in this period.
8 The third volume of the second edition of The Principal Hakluyt included an account of the
voyage by John Jane, an experienced sailor and close associate of Cavendish’s third in
command on the voyage, John Davis, the experienced navigator and seaman. The 1591
fleet consisted of “three tall ships and two barks” says Jane, all privately owned, and
which cost Cavendish the immense sum of approximately £13,000 to fit out (Jane 842).
The large ships were the Galleon Leicester (400 tons,  admiral of the fleet and carrying
Cavendish), the Roebucke (240 tons, vice-admiral, captained by John Cocke, Cavendish’s
relative); the Desire (120/140 tons, rear admiral, Cavendish’s former flagship, and veteran
of his earlier circumnavigation and now captained by Davis). The two smaller ships were
the Dainty or Delight (captained by Randolph Cotton, close friend of Davis and co-owned
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by Davis), and the Black Pinnace (captained probably by Tobias Parris/Paris) (Edwards 23).
Davis had agreed to sail with Cavendish on the understanding that he could explore for
the western end of the northern passage once the fleet reached California. Cavendish’s
voyage was likely to appeal to Davis, since his lifelong aim was to find a navigable shorter
passage to China by sailing North West, North, or North East – thus opening the East to
the West.
 
Thomas Cavendish
Fig. 2 Engraving by Crispin van de Passe from Efﬁgies Regum ac Principium (1598). The legend from 
The Aeneid “EXTREMOS PUDEAT REDISSE” (“It would be shameful to return last of all”) may be an
allusion to Cavendish’s refusal to return with dishonour or, alternatively, an attack on Davis, who did
return last in June 1593 on the Desire (the Galleon had arrived in February of March).
http://www.geheugenvannederland.nl/nl/geheugen/view?coll=ngvn&identiﬁer=BVB01%
3ABDH19058PK. Available via Wikimedia Commons
9 It was by any standards a tragic and unsuccessful voyage – of the 350 or so men who
departed in 1591, at least two-thirds died. Yet the principals and their supporters fiercely
contested what actually happened at sea, and why, as well as where the blame lay for
failure. By the time Hakluyt printed Jane’s account, he was almost certainly aware that
Cavendish  had  written  a  narrative  of  events  shortly  before  he  died  (Quinn  Hakluyt
Handbook II 458). It may have simply have been that Hakluyt was unable to get hold of
Cavendish’s manuscript (Quinn, The Last Voyage 45),12 since he would surely have taken an
eager interest in his version of events since his late wife, Douglas Cavendish Hakluyt, who
died in 1597, was most probably first cousin to the circumnavigator (Miyuki Ota Hollis
45).13 His connections to Davis and Jane, though, were also strong. In both editions of The
Principal Navigations, Hakluyt included multiple accounts of their northern explorations,
including in the 1589 edition narratives about all three of Davis’s 1580s arctic missions,
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two written by Jane, and one by Davis himself, and Hakluyt amplified and extended the
northern material further in the second edition (Fuller 15-29).
10 In what follows, I explore how the semantic contest for the “power of command” played
out on Cavendish’s last voyage. In other words, I focus on the vocabulary used by key
protagonists  to describe each other’s  positions,  how they question and challenge the
power of command, including what the terminology of command reveals more broadly
about the changing values of leadership at sea at this time. The meanings of “generall,”
“captain,” and “master” (in Jane’s account all three terms describe different individuals
amongst the expedition’s leaders) were evolving rapidly at this time. My larger argument
is that changing terminology and meanings are reflective and constitutive of the ways
leadership roles themselves were in process of redefinition to suit new requirements and
values emergent in English overseas expansionism at the end of the sixteenth century,
particularly regarding the professionalization of seamanship.
11 The “Generall” in Jane’s account, short-form of “Captain-General,” was not a specifically
amphibious role but a gubernatorial one, and the term used solely to describe Cavendish
on the expedition. It was also a term that was beginning to diminish in reputation and
respect at this time, as other terms were used more regularly to describe the commander
in chief).14 According to Cooke’s “Narrative”, Doughty bitterly used the term “Generall” to
refer Drake, as he questioned his authority over him and the other gentlemen officers,
and it is noticeable that here, and in Jane’s account it is the specifically military aspect of
the role, i.e. the term “general” not “captain,” that is used as its short-form (Penzer 150).
Martin Frobisher was also the “Generall” in published accounts of his 1578 voyage north
to “Meta Incognita,” when his armada of fifteen ships returned with twelve hundred tons
of valueless pyrites believing it to be gold ore, an outcome that damaged his reputation
for  some  years,  indicating  perhaps  the  declining  prestige  of  the  term  (MacDermott
153-62). Possibly even more significant in 1590s England, with the nation at war with
Spain,  “Capitán  General”  was  the  favoured  title  of  the  Iberian  nations  for  their
commanders  and colonial  leaders  after  the  conquest  of  America.  Indeed,  during  the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,  the two main naval  captain general  posts  were
Capitán-General  de  la  Armada  de  la  Mar  Oceana and  Capitán-General  de  Galeras,  with
responsibility for the Atlantic and the Mediterranean respectively,  and the term was
particularly associated with colonial rule of the military and administrative divisions in
Spanish America and the Spanish Philippines.15 Following the publication in 1583 of an
English translation of Bartolmé de las Casas’s Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las
Indias (published  in  Spanish  in  1552),  depicting  the  inhumane  treatment  that  the
indigenous  people  endured during  the  early  stages  of  the  Spanish  conquest,  English
colonial ambitions were redefined and amplified. The English used the resulting so-called
“Black Legend” of anti-Spanish propaganda to justify their own expansionism in moral
and  theological  terms,  by  claiming  to  refuse  worship  from  the  indigenous  peoples
encountered, unlike Spanish explorers, for instance (Hodgkin 85). The gradual decline in
the English use of “Captain General,” the term favoured in the Spanish New World, was
thus part of an English desire to assert distinct colonial ambitions, behaviour, and even
terminology, especially with the nations at war.
12 The term “captain” was also changing in meaning in England at the end of the sixteenth
century, as it began to be used amphibiously more regularly, to mean the commander at
sea, and/or the legal superior at sea and/or chief navigation officer at sea. It was a term
particularly used by privateers and, less frequently, by merchant commanders. In the
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English Navy, or “navy royal,” the term “captain” described a specifically military role at
sea,  with  “master  mariners”  taking  care  of  the  actual  navigation.  The  English  navy,
however, was not a large force and did not have a permanent body of officers or seamen
as the shape of the amphibious defence force against the Armada in 1588 graphically
reveals; of the 226 ships mustered, only 34 were Queen’s ships, with the rest privately
owned (Friel, “Elizabethan Merchant Ships”). The OED dates the first usage of “captain” to
mean commander of the ship to 1555, when Richard Eden translated Peter Martyr of
Angleria’s Decades of the Newe Worlde “This capitayne Wyndam, puttyng furth of his shyp
at Porchmouth.”16 Certainly, Thomas Wyndham, instrumental in establishing the Barbary
and Guinea trades, was a well-known privateer as well as a merchant (Andrews 61-62).
The Middle English Dictionary entry dates the first usages of the term as referring to the
commander of troops fighting on the ship earlier, to the middle of the fifteenth century.17
In other words, by the turn of the seventeenth century, the more diminutive form of
“captain” was starting to emerge as the dominant, and favoured, term to describe the
man-in-charge at sea. Certainly, in accounts of Davis’s 1580s three arctic fleets that set
out in search of the Northwest Passage, Jane only uses the term “Captain” to describe
Davis’s position within each expedition’s fleet of ships, never “Generall.” Given that Davis
was actually in effect performing the role of “Captain General” for the Arctic fleets, Jane’s
use of “Captain” for him but “Generall” for Cavendish when in an analogous role on the
latter’s attempt at a second circumnavigation, signals Jane’s greater respect for the first
half of the term.
13 With  this  evolving  terminology  of  leadership  in  mind,  what  exactly  happened  on
Cavendish’s voyage, and in what ways is it reflective of changing values associated with
the performance of effective command at sea? Cavendish’s fleet sought to reach China
and  Japan  via  Cape  Horn,  and  he  wished  to  repeat  his  highly  profitable  earlier
circumnavigation, which had left unfinished business because the small size of its ships
had meant Cavendish had been unable to carry home to England all the captured treasure
(Petty 819-22). By 1591, Cavendish was in straightened circumstances financially, and to
avoid repeating his past mistake, he deliberately took larger ships on the new voyage in
order not to have to leave behind treasure.
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Cavendish (on the right, shown with Drake (centre) and John Hawkins (left) in Great St Anna pearls.
Fig. 3. This painting is probably a copy of Daniel Myten’s painting of the same subject which was
owned by Lord Lothian. Seventeenth-century British School.
© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London. [Permission required]
14 Cavendish’s  desire  for  bigger  ships  led  to  a  crucial,  and  fatal,  inflexibility  in  the
expedition:  smaller ships could have secured supplies from hostile ports  with barred
harbours on both America’s Western and Eastern seaboards. When the fleet dispersed
well before reaching the Pacific, having failed to pass through the Magellan Straight, and
split up in contested circumstances, following a bitter dispute concerning authority over
course and direction, Cavendish was left with only large ships, the Galleon Leicester and
the Roebuck. Davis made it back to England the following year in the small vessel, the
Desire; this was a ship essential to the success of the overall mission, and hence Davis
suffered for this rest of his career from the charge that he had deserted Cavendish.
15 So  what  was  at  stake  in  the  argument  over  direction  and  command?  After  leaving
Plymouth, the fleet was first becalmed for nearly four weeks, and then diverted to Santos
in  Brazil  to  re-provision,  missing  the  southern  summer,  the  best  time  to  clear  the
Magellan Strait. Beset by storms, frost, and high mortality on the biggest ships, Cavendish
was unable to pass the Strait, and gave up, planning instead to take the Good Hope route
to the East Indies. Davis, more accustomed to Arctic conditions, was undeterred: “our
captain”  says  Jane  “because  he  was  a  man  that  had  good  experience  […]  told  him
[Cavendish] that this snow was a matter of no long continuance” (Jane 843). Put another
way, the experienced professional mariner “Captain” Davis tells the anxious, apparently
inexperienced “Generall” Cavendish good advice that conditions at sea were likely to
improve. Of course, since Cavendish had passed through the Strait of Magellan on his
circumnavigation, and Davis had never successfully navigated it,  Jane’s description of
The Hero and the Sea: Sea Captains and their Discontents
XVII-XVIII, 74 | 2017
8
Captain Davis as the man with the authority of experience is both disingenuous and,
perhaps,  designed  to  provoke  the  “Generall.”  Yet,  implicit  in  Jane’s  account  is  the
struggle between tarpaulin and socially elite officers. Davis’s social background is obscure
as, connected to the Devon-based maritime Gilbert family, he “reputedly spent his youth
in maritime pursuits, the necessary training for a professional seaman, almost certainly
in  subordinate  and  unrecorded  capacities  on  the  Gilberts’  major  voyages,”  while
Cavendish,  ten-years  younger,  was  both  rich  and  much  better  connected,  though  a
notorious spendthrift (ODNB).
16 After further argument, and against Davis’s advice, Cavendish then withdrew north to
Santos again, and Davis remained at Port Desire, perhaps because of a misunderstanding
or perhaps, as the close-to-death Cavendish claimed in his last letter, from self-interested
betrayal – “onely [his] treacherie hath beene the utter ruine of all,” Cavendish claimed
(Hitchcock, Charges 264). In fact, contrary to Davis’s later testimony, Cavendish did in
fact  specify  a  rendezvous,  confirmed  in  a  third  account  of  the  voyage  by  Anthony
Knyvett, also published by Purchas in 1625 (Edwards 90). Knyvett was a gentleman officer
on  the  Galleon Leicester and  was  no  particular  supporter  of  Cavendish,  since,  due  to
frostbite, Cavendish had wanted to put him ashore to take his chances in the freezing
conditions of the Strait of Magellan. In fact, Davis was well aware that Cavendish needed
the  smaller  vessels,  which  alone  were  able  to  enter  shallow  waters;  without  them,
Cavendish  was  destined  to  fail.  Evidently,  Davis’s  own  crew  also  appreciated  the
significance of the Desire for the success of the circumnavigation, as only a little over half
of them backed his decision when asked for their support, while others mutinied and,
Jane recounts, unsuccessfully plotted to kill him.
17 Separated and bereft of stores, Davis’s outlook on the Desire was poor; he nevertheless
made three further efforts to pass the Strait, but storms beat him back each time. Finally,
after  returning  to  Port  Desire  on  27  October  1592,  Davis  provisioned  the  ship  with
approximately  14,000  dried  penguins  for  the  journey  home.  Despite  losing  men  in
skirmishes with Patagonian Indians and the Portuguese, and privations, Davis himself
was among the fourteen survivors of the original complement of seventy-five who arrived
home on 11 June 1593. Subjected to an inquiry ordered by the privy council  into his
conduct on the evidence of Cavendish’s last letter, Davis defended himself against the
charges – he says in the dedication of his manual The Seaman’s Secrets (1595) to the Lord
High Admiral “were I faulty of so foul a crime, I were worthy of ten thousand torments”
(Edwards  88).  Davis  was  released,  though  his  reputation  suffered,  despite  Hakluyt’s
inclusion of the version of events most sympathetic to him.
18 One of the most noticeable features of the fleet was its unusual demographic make-up,
and this is  crucial  to explaining the voyage’s  fractious nature,  and the contradictory
accounts  it  generated.  According  to  Nathaniel  Butler’s  book  on  seamanship  Botelier’s
Dialogues (1634),  expeditions  were  recommended to  crew a  vessel  at  the  rate  of  one
crewmember (i.e. sailor) per every four tons up to 400 tons, after which there should be
one crewmember for every three tons (Hitchcock Purposes 6).  On the Desire,  it seems
there were twenty-eight sailors when thirty-five were needed to crew the 140-ton vessel;
in  addition,  there  were  on  board  forty-seven  “gentlemen.”  According  to  Jane,  Davis
argued against  changing course for the Cape of  Good Hope (i.e.  the route Cavendish
wanted) because there were not enough experienced sailors: “among seventie and five
persons,  there is  but the Master alone that can order the Shippe,  and but fourteene
saylers.  The  rest  are  gentlemen, serving  men  and  artificers”  (Jane  843).  Indeed,  on
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Cavendish’s  fleet  in  general,  the  number  of  crew  was  small,  and  it  is  clear  from
Cavendish’s, Jane’s, and from Knyvett’s accounts that of the 350 total ships’ company,
approximately sixty per cent were gentlemen. In other words, to accommodate the large
numbers  of  gentlemen  on  board,  the  number  of  experienced  sailors  had  been
significantly cut.
19 This  demographic would undoubtedly have led to tension,  especially in times of  bad
weather, sickness, physical attack, or privation, which were especially frequent of this
expedition. Though on Elizabethan ships the sailors were meant to fight, and the soldiers
were supposed to undertake shipboard work (unlike on Spanish ships were a division of
duties between soldiers and sailors was maintained), it is clear that on Cavendish’s fleet
“gentlemen” did not work (Knyvett confirms that he took no part in shipboard tasks,
even  before  his  frostbite).  Since  the  low  number  of  sailors  on  the  expedition  was
Cavendish’s decision, Davis uses it to argue it limits the options for the fleet’s course, as,
he  says,  fourteen sailors  is  inadequate  to  sail  it.  With such a  demographic,  soldiers,
underemployed on-board ship,  were likely to pressurise key decisions to favour their
pillaging opportunities (particularly as privateering voyages did not pay wages,  but a
share of the “thirds,” or profits), or, worse, to foment mutiny.
20 Neither Davis nor Cavendish were successful  in controlling their shipboard company.
Both faced mutiny following key decisions, when they struggled to exert their authority.
Cavendish’s best chance of success on the voyage was continuing to try to pass the Strait
when Davis said he should. Once this opportunity was lost, the large size of his ships and
the lack of sailors on them meant Cavendish was always likely to fail on the Cape of Good
Hope route. Likewise, because Davis was captain of Cavendish’s old ship, with many of his
old crew,  who remained loyal  to their  previous leader,  they blamed Davis  for  losing
Cavendish.  However,  by  choosing  to  print  Jane’s  account  Hakluyt  appears  to  be
prioritizing the views and ethos of the professional sailor, or tarpaulin captain, during
on-board arguments.  We do not  know the reasons why Hakluyt  only included Jane’s
account  in  The  Principal  Navigations,  but  the  decision  certainly  emphasizes  the  key
importance  of  following  the  command of  the  sailor  as  represented  by  the  tarpaulin
captain/master, rather than the soldier (or “Generall”). In other words, the implication is
that the advice of the experienced professional seaman rather than a talented amateur is
more  likely  to  advance  England’s  imperial  and  colonial  agenda.  In  1992,  Richard
Helgerson argued Hakluyt prioritized the activities of merchants, rather than aristocrats,
as the instruments for successful English overseas expansion: “Hakluyt’s Voyages does
represent  […]  a  fundamentally  new  alignment  of  power  in  England  […]  in  which
merchants  and  mercantile  activity  had  an  ever  increasing  share”  (Helgerson  181).
Hakluyt’s  privileging  of  the  professional  sailor  represents  a  nuanced  version  of  this
dynamic. In other words, for Hakluyt the sort of seaman most likely to progress England’s
overseas enterprise were professional sea captains. Furthermore, as Hakluyt made clear
in the “Preface to the Reader” of the first volume of the second edition, it was in their
northern expeditions, such as the ones Davis favoured, that the English could rival, and
better,  the  achievements  of  other  European  nation  states  had  enjoyed  from  their
American or Indian explorations.
[W]ill it not in all posteritie be as great a renowme unto our English nation, to have
bene the first discoverers of a Sea beyond the North Cape (never certainly knowen
before) and of a convenient passage into the huge Empire of Russia […] as for the
Portugales to  have  found  a  Sea  beyond  the  Cape  of  Bueno  Esperanza,  and  so
consequently a passage by Sea into the east Indies, or for the Italians and Spaniards to
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have  discovered  unknowen  lands  so  many  hundred  leagues  westward  and
southwestward […]. (Hakluyt Preface 2nd edn.)
In other words, for Hakluyt, a professional seaman like Davis was the man most likely to
achieve the type of success in Northern navigation, exploration, and trade that he sought
for England as “first discoverers.” It seems therefore to have been a deliberate decision
on  Hakluyt’s  part  to  privilege  “Captain”  Davis  over  “General”  Cavendish.  Certainly,
Hakluyt’s  naming of Jane in the title of  the account as “a man of good observation”
endorses the latter’s  authority,  as does his  highlighting of  Jane’s  long and successful
maritime experience with Davis in Northern voyages “imployed in the same, and many
other voyages” (Jane 842). Maritime experience and strategic purpose forge a “captain” at
sea for Hakluyt and after, it seems rather than simply wealth or bravura, or military
success.
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ENDNOTES
1. For discussion see, for example, Hadfield; and Jowitt, The Culture of Piracy.
2. Scholarship on this topic is immense, but for a useful overview see Pagden, Lords of all the World
.
3. The second expanded edition drops the second “l” from “principall;” for ease and economy of
words, and as I am discussing both editions in this essay often at the same time, Hakluyt’s text is
always termed The Principal Navigations.
4. Cavendish’s account was first published in 1625 by Samuel Purchas in Hakluytus Posthumus or
Purchas his Pilgrimes.
5. For  a  longue  durée history  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  see  Peregrine  Horden  and  Nicholas
Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, passim.
6. The historiography on nineteenth-century imperialism is too large to be exhaustively cited
here; for a brisk, recent overview see Porter, British Imperial.
7. For a fuller discussion of Hakluyt’s work see Payne, Richard Hakluyt; Mancall, Hakluyt’s Promise;
Carey and Jowitt, Richard Hakluyt and Travel Writing.
8. For discussion, see Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood; Smith, Shakespeare and Masculinity, 39-66.
9. For an account of Hakluyt’s struggles to get an account of Drake’s circumnavigation into print,
and other contemporary reactions to it, see Quinn, “Early Accounts” 33-48.
10. See Frankot, “Medieval Maritime Law,” 151-72.
11. “When medieval knights embarked, ships’ masters did their bidding, and that was another
custom of which the vestiges still survived: Sir Hugh Willoughby, for example, was a gentleman
and a knight but not a seaman, and the practical seamen were his subordinates.” See Caine, <
http://academia.wikia.com/wiki/
Journal_of_History_and_Classics:_Doubting_Thomas:_the_Dought
(ie)_Affair_in_Fictive_History_and_Historical_Fiction>
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12. Quinn  suggests  that  Hakluyt  acquired  Cavendish’s  manuscript  later,  and  then  passed  to
Purchas. It may simply have been that Hakluyt was unable to get hold of the manuscript before
the second edition of The Principal Navigations was published, as the narrative was “written with
his [i.e. Cavendish’s] owne hand to Sir Tristram Gorges his Executor,” as Purchas put it when he
published it in Purchas His Pilgrimes in 1625. Certainly, Cavendish’s estate was not settled until 4
February 1596, when probate on it was finally granted. The reasons for the delay is unknown:
Quinn, in his edition of the Cavendish’s account and will, suggests that the Privy Council may
have withheld the documents until Cavendish’s charges against Davis had “been finally disposed
of […].” See The Hakluyt Handbook, II, 458; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, vol. 4, bk. Vi. 1192; Quinn,
The Last Voyage, 41.
13. Some sources indicate that Douglas Hakluyt was Cavendish’s sister. See Miyuki Ota Hollis,
“The Social Navigations,” 45. Cavendish’s will states “if my saide Executor shall finde. (him self &
all other duties being satisfied) any ouerplus of the saide goodes remaining to my sister Anne
Caundish to be vnto her as her owne proper goodes,” but there is some confusion regarding the
identity Anne Cavendish. Robert Dudley, illegitimate son of the Earl of Leicester, who took at
letters of administration in March 1593 for the goods of Thomas Cavendish, was the husband of
Cavendish’s sister, but sources disagree concerning whether her name was Margaret or Anne
Cavendish. Margaret Cavendish was Douglas Cavendish’s sister, and hence it is unclear whether
Hakluyt was Thomas Cavendish’s cousin-by-marriage, or his brother-in-law.
14. <http://www.oed.com.ueaezproxy.uea.ac.uk:2048/view/Entry/27622>
15. For discussion of the development of the Spanish New World, including its administration,
see J. H. Elliot, Spain and Its World; Henry Kamen, Empire.
16. <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/27616> See also the definition in Smyth’s  Sailor's  Word-
Book “the officer commanding a line-of-battle ship, or a frigate carrying twenty or more cannon.”
The “captain-general” is the “highest army rank,” 161-62.
17. <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/m/mec/medidx?type=id&id=MED6722&egs=all> “ There
shulde be chosen and nempned viii of Knyghtes and worthy Swyers of the West, of the South, and
of the North..and yerof the Kyng, oure Soveraigne Lord, chese suche on as hym liketh to be a
chief  Capytayne,  and other vii..for  to  attende the saide chief  Capytayne;  so  that  every grete
Shippe have a Capytayne withynne borde,” (1442) Rolls of Parliament.
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